In Korea, the price schedule for local telephone combines two-part tariffs and peakload pricing subject to rate-of-return (RoR) regulation. Although the effect of RoR regulation on two-part tariffs or peak-load pricing has been separately analyzed by many authors in some detail, the behaviour of regulated firm under combined two-part and peak-load pricing has not been studied until now. This paper examines the effect of regulation on the rate structure and welfare under combined two-part and peak-load pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Korea, local telephone pricing combines two-part tariffs and peak-load pricing subject to rate-of-return (RoR) regulation. Why does the telephone company prefer two-part tariffs together with peak-load pricing? Oi [1] argued that a monopolistic firm prefers two-part tariffs to uniform pricing because the monopoly can levy a fixed charge on consumers and so can increase profits. On the other hand, the telephone company faces capacity constraint and cyclical pattern of demand, which result in peak load problem. Such features common to the telephone company as monopoly, capacity constraint and cyclical pattern of demand give it a motivation to introduce combined two-part and peak-load pricing.
Each of these features has been separately analyzed in some detail. Averch and Johnson [2] examined the effect of RoR regulation on a profit maximizing monopoly firm, which was thereafter expanded by many authors. Twopart tariff structures in a profit maximization setting were examined by Oi [1] , and extended by Littlechild [3] and Schmalensee [4] , among others. Two-part tariffs have also been applied to problems of social welfare maximization by Feldstein [5] , Ng and Weisser [6] , Littlechild [3] , Leland and Meyer [7] , Brander and Spencer [8] and Panzar and Sibley [9] , among others. In this paper, we focus on profit maximizing two-part tariffs, but we want, in particular, to examine the effect of RoR regulation on such tariffs for a profit maximizing enterprise facing a capacity constraint. Capacity constraints give rise to peak-load pricing, which was originated in Steiner [10] and Boiteux [11] , and developed further by Hirshleifer [12] , Wellisz [13] , Williamson [14] , Wenders [15] , Bergstrom and Mackie-Mason [16] and others.
Sherman and Visscher [17] developed a model that examined the effect of RoR regulation on two-part tariffs. They argued that in the typical case the RoR regulated, profitmaximizing enterprise offering two-part tariffs would increase the fixed charge and decrease the usage charge as compared with an unregulated profit maximizer. 1 An empirical examination by Henderson [18] supports the Sherman-Visscher theory that tighter RoR regulation encourages a monopolist to adopt more rapidly declining rate structures. We consider a simple model in which a telephone company can levy a fixed charge per subscriber per unit of time as well as peak and offpeak usage charges for the good. 2 This paper examines the effect of RoR regulation on combined two-part and peak-load pricing for a profitmaximizing firm that produces with one plant (or technique), and examines its effect on welfare.
Some of the results are as follows. Relative 1 Sherman and Visscher [17] examine a constant returns case with fixed coefficients in production. 2 We consider the case in which the fixed charge is flat. In Hopkinson's two-part tariffs, the fixed charge is not flat, but differentiated. See Okuno [23] for the case of differentiated fixed charge which is varied with consumer's contract capacity.
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to the unregulated profit maximizer,the regulated firm will set the peak charge lower, the offpeak charge at the same level, and the fixed charge higher. We confirm that the AverchJohnson effect holds even for RoR regulation on combined two-part and peak-load pricing. The benefits of regulation do not influence both periods of the service but the peak period only, which distorts peak-load pricing incentives. This problem can be corrected by imposing a unit tax on capacity. When regulation is imposed on the firm, the profit is lower and the net consumer's surplus is higher, but the effect on social welfare is ambiguous. The welfare increasing effect of regulation in uniform pricing examined by Sheshinski [19] is not applicable to combined two-part and peak-load pricing model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we examine the consumer's and firm's problems. In Section III, the behaviour of the unregulated profit and social welfare maximizers is analyzed. Section IV introduces RoR regulation, and presents the effect of regulation upon combined two-part and peak-load pricing. Section V gives the summary of the study.
II. THE MODEL
Assume that there are a continuum of consumers distributed according to taste variable. It is also assumed that a consumer with taste t and initial endowment y facing peak charge p 1 and offpeak charge p 2 has the indirect utility function of the form 3 v. p; y; t/ Á maxfu.x; t/ C qjy D px C qg; .1/ where p and x denote price and per capita consumption vectors in the peak and offpeak periods, respectively, and q is a composite good whose price is normalized to 1. We assume that u.x; t/ is continuous, has continuous first and second order partial derivatives, and is a strictly quasi-concave function.
For ease of exposition, we confine ourselves to the simple case of one plant and two equal length periods with independent demands. 4 3 This form of utility function is equivalent to the assumption that demand interdependence between the public enterprise goods and a composite good is negligible. Therefore, the marginal social utility of income is not materially affected by the prices charged by the public enterprise. This means that no distinction need to be made between Marshallian and Hicksian demand owing to no income effects. 4 Steiner [10] assumes a typical day divided into two equal length periods, each governed by its own independent demand curve. Williamson [14] shows how to treat the case with unequal periods.
consumer with taste t when the fixed charge is zero. We make the strong monotonicity assumption that demands are assumed to increase with taste, so also does consumer's surplus at any given prices provided demands are greater than zero. 5 
Arranging results of differentiating dM=dO t and dX=dO t yields the amount purchased by the marginal consumer:
The total consumer's welfare vector for the good in the society is defined by
Arranging results of dM=dO t and dV=dO t and applying v. p; O t / D f yield the fixed charge:
In addition, the total net consumer's welfare vector for the good in the society is defined by
It is assumed that the cost of producing the good is of two kinds: an operating cost and a capacity cost. The operating cost, assumed to be proportional to the amount produced, can be represented by c.X 1 C X 2 /, where c is a positive constant and where X 1 and X 2 are defined as total output in the peak and offpeak periods, respectively. The capacity cost is proportional to the capacity K, which is defined as the maximum amount suppliable in each period. Hence, if we represent the marginal capacity cost byˇ, a positive constant, the total capacity cost can be written asˇK. 6 Therefore the total cost function in the enterprise can be expressed by TC D c.
On the other hand, it is assumed that the peak demand is so much greater than the offpeak demand that even when the charge is set to recover all capacity cost during the peak period, consumers would not use all capacity during the offpeak period. This is what Steiner would call the firm-peak case. The required capacity is represented by K D X 1 > X 2 .
III. THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE UNREGULATED FIRM
In this section we start by considering profit maximization with no regulation. Profits are given by
.5/
Assuming that a maximum exists, the solution can be characterized by setting the partial derivatives of Π equal to zero if it is differentiable there. However M and X will normally be discontinuous at t D 0 and p D 0. Consequently, the derivative is taken to be the well defined right hand derivative. Optimal solutions are characterized by the following first order conditions (6) yields the following weakened Ramsey rule:
or
where N x j D X j =M denotes average consumption for period j per subscriber; e j D
. p j =X j /.@X j =@p j / is the total own price elasticity of demand for period j. We obtain the familiar rule that the relative markups should be inversely proportional to the total own price elasticities. The relative markup denotes the ratio between the profit margin (usage charge minus marginal cost) and the usage charge for each period. The markups are increased with the disparity between the average and the marginal consumer's consumption. Since we assume that demand is increased with taste, we find that the markups always have the plus sign in (6-1) and . If all consumers' tastes are identical, the profit margins will be zero. We may now state the following Proposition: Proposition 1 Given that cross price elasticities are zero at a two-part optimum under periodic demand, usage charges of the unregulated profit maximizing firm are greater than marginal costs.
Oi [1] shows that a monopolist producing a single output will set a usage charge above marginal cost given two types of consumers if the consumers' demand curves do not intersect. Proposition 1 also shows, under the same condition as Oi's, that usage charges are greater than marginal costs although we extend a two-part tariff model to combined twopart and peak-load pricing model. Proposition 1 holds even if cross price elasticities are not zero, as long as they are expected to be much smaller than own price elasticities. (See Appendix A.)
The optimal fixed charge may be denoted by the sum of consumer's surplus enjoyed by a marginal consumer in both periods.
where 
The most profitable fixed charge equals the amount by which fixed charge revenues are reduced in order to attract a marginal consumer less profit on sales to him in both periods.
Let us consider the case of a social welfare maximizer. Social welfare function will be defined as the sum of net consumer's welfare given in (4) plus profits given in (5) The economic rationale for Proposition 2 is that any increase in demand during the peak period requires the firm to expand capacity, and hence has a higher cost than any increase in demand which occurs during the period when there is excess capacity. Hence, each usage charge is levied enough to compensate exactly for the increased cost associated with satisfying each demand. In addition to these results, the fact that the fixed charge is zero yields to a social welfare maximization.
If all the consumers are assumed to be the same, they all consume the service while paying a fixed charge that essentially absorbs all their consumer surplus. As a consequence, the monopoly solution and the welfare solution are identical. In the heterogeneous consumer's case, however, we can see, from Propositions 1 and 2, that the social welfare solution is different from the monopoly solution.
IV. THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE REGULATED FIRM
The enterprise is constrained in two ways: the capacity and profit constraints. The capacity constraint is represented in K D X 1 > X 2 . We consider RoR regulation for the profit constraint, which is currently utilized for public utilities in the U.S.A. and Japan as well as in Korea. Under this method the firm's profit may not exceed a fixed amount for each unit of its capacity. The regulatory constraint may thus be written by F D .
ˇ/K Π , where . ˇ/ is the rate-of-return on capital allowed by regulatory commission.
The enterprise chooses . p 1 ; p 2 ; f / to maximize profits subject to the capacity and profit constraints. The Lagrange function for this problem is L D Π C .F Π /, where is non-negative Lagrange multiplier associated with the profit regulatory constraint. (See Appendix B for the proofs.) In order to analyze the effect of regulation on the pricing structure, we use the Kuhn-Tucker method in formulating the problem. Optimal solutions are characterized by the following first order conditions
To show the effect of regulation on tariffs, we use the comparative statics technique. We de- (8), we get the following equations after some arrangement
where s D . ˇ/=.1 / > 0, since >ǎ nd 0 < < 1. Substituting F D . ˇ/K into (10-1) and taking the total differential, we obtain
If we substitute (8-1) and (8-2) into the first and second terms of the R.H.S. of (10-3), respectively, we find that the coefficient of dp 2 =d is zero, and get the following equations for dp 1 =d and dp 2 =d
and
where s > 0, @X 1 =@p 1 < 0, and p 1 > c Cˇand p 2 > c from Proposition 1. Thus, the stronger regulation results in a lower peak charge but does not affect an offpeak charge, if we mean by stronger regulation a smaller allowed rate-of-return. The lower peak charge results in a greater increase in capacity. From (10-4) and (10-5), we find the fact that RoR regulation results in a higher fixed charge.
It can be seen that regulation based on a rate-of-return on capacity does not affect the offpeak charge. But the peak charge is lower and the fixed charge is higher than those in the unregulated case. Because constrained profits increase with the level of capacity, the enterprise passes on the benefits of regulation to those users whose increased demand will cause an increase in capacity. Thus regulation increases the output in the peak period and does not change the output in the offpeak period from the unregulated firm's level. The preceding discussion suggests the following result:
Proposition 3
The RoR regulated, profitmaximizing firm is to set the peak charge lower, the offpeak charge equal to, and the fixed charge higher than in the unregulated profit maximizing case. As the allowed rateof-return is smaller, the peak charge becomes lower, thus resulting in a greater increase in capacity.
The benefits of regulation have not influ- 
where s D . ˇ/=.1 / > 0; and N p 1 and N p 2 are the choke-off prices (the lowest prices at which there is no demand) in each period. If D 0, then s D s. As the tax rate increases, the optimum peak charge increases but the offpeak charge is unchanged. The imposition of a unit tax results in a higher peak charge and a smaller capacity relative to the no-tax case. Let us consider the situation in which the regulator levies the tax rate at s . In this case, the capacity is decreasing to the level of the unregulated firm. If the regulator raises the tax rate more, the capacity is decreased from the unregulated one's level.
A lump-sum or a profit tax will reduce the profit after taxes of a profit maximizing firm under RoR regulation, but will not affect the firm's optimum price-quantity combination. (See Appendix C for the proofs.)
We now investigate the consequences of this tariff in terms of net consumer's welfare, profit, and social welfare, when regulation is imposed. Concerning the regulated peak charge and the marginal cost, there are three possible cases to be considered: p 1 > c Cˇ, p 1 D c Cˇ, and p 1 < c Cˇ. CASE 1. p 1 > c CW e assume that the regulated peak charge exceeds the appropriate marginal cost. This case can be easily realized in circumstances that the regulator imposes a stronger regulation on the firm, i.e., the allowed rate-of-return, , has a slim margin overˇ, or that not only is the disparity in the marginal-to-average consumption large, but the total own price elasticity in the peak period is large. In this case, the net consumer's surplus is increased by imposing RoR regulation. On the other hand, to see that the regulated firm's profit is smaller than the unregulated firm's profit requires no computation. The gain of social welfare under this regulation is higher than in the unregulated case. See Appendix D-1 for proofs. CASE 2. p 1 D c CW e assume that the regulated peak charge is equal to the appropriate marginal cost. In this case, we find that the net consumer's surplus is increased, but the profit is decreased by imposing regulation. The gain of social welfare under this regulation is higher than in the unregulated case. Appendix D-2 contains the proofs. CASE 3. p 1 < c CW e assume that the regulated peak charge is lower than the appropriate marginal cost. This case can be easily realized in circumstances that the regulator imposes a weaker regulation on the firm or that the disparity in the marginal-to-average consumption and the total own price elasticity in the peak period are small at the same time, while case 1 is easily feasible in the opposite circumstances. When regulation is imposed, the gain of net consumer's surplus is positive but the gain of profit is negative. It is not explicit whether the gain of social welfare under regulation is higher or lower than in the unregulated case. Appendix D-3 contains the proofs.
Proposition 4 Under combined two-part and peak-load pricing, the effect of RoR regulation on social welfare is not clear: increasing or ambiguous.
Sheshinski [19] examined the effect of RoR regulation on social welfare, when the case is simple uniform pricing. He showed that regulation is always advantageous from the point of view of welfare. The welfare increasing effect of RoR regulation was also examined by Klevorick [20] and Callen, Mathewson and Mohring [21] , among others. However, it is not explicit whether the gain of social welfare under RoR regulation is higher than in the unregulated case, when the firm adopts combined two-part and peak-load pricing. In the homogeneous consumers' case, regulation on combined two-part and peak-load pricing decreases social welfare [22] . 7 This result is entirely different from that of Sheshinski's.
V. SUMMARY
When regulation is imposed on combined two-part and peak-load pricing for the profitmaximizing firm, the optimal tariff structure depends on the following three factors: the elasticities of demands, the ratio of the consumption of marginal consumer to the average consumption, and marginal costs. Price elas- 7 In the heterogeneous consumer's case, Regulation results in three possible cases concerning the regulated peak charge and the marginal cost: p 1 > c Cˇand p 1 D c Cˇas well as p 1 < c Cˇ. But Regulation, in the homogeneous consumer's case, results in only one case: p 1 < cCˇ. These results show that the gain of social welfare under regulation is decreased in the homogeneous consumer's case and increased or ambiguous in the heterogeneous consumer's case.
ticities of demands are, as with the usual Ramsey pricing rule, inversely related to relative markups for each periods in the profit maximizing solution whether it is regulated or unregulated. In the social welfare maximizing solution, however, price elasticities have no effect on profit margins. Similarly, the marginalto-average ratio of consumption, as denoted in (6-1) and (6-2), is inversely related to relative markups in the profit maximizing solution but unrelated in the social welfare maximizing solution.
RoR regulation results in a decrease in capital cost in the peak period, but does not have any effect on operating costs. The regulated enterprise operates inefficiently because it installs more peak load capacity but does not expand the offpeak use, thereby causing a poorer average utilization of capacity. We thus find the Averch-Johnson effect stands even for the RoR regulation on combined two-part and peak-load pricing. Compared to the unregulated profit maximizer, the peak charge will be relatively lower, the offpeak charge identical, and the fixed charge higher. The benefits of regulation do not influence both periods of the service but to the peak period only, which distorts peak-load pricing incentives. This problem can be corrected by imposing a unit tax on capacity. Although regulation is imposed on the profit maximizing firm, the profit is lower and the net consumer's surplus is higher, but the effect of RoR regulation on social welfare is ambiguous. The welfare increasing effect of regulation in uniform pricing examined by Sheshinski is not applicable to our model.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Professors Hiroshi Atsumi, Hiroyuki Odagiri, Makoto Ohta and Roger Sherman for their helpful comments and discussions of the ideas in this article. I would also like to express my gratitude to anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
APPENDIX A
Given p 1 > 0 and p 2 > 0, using @ f=@p j D O x j in (6) yields the following weakened Ramsey rule: where e ji D . p i =X j /.@X j =@p i / denotes the cross price elasticity of demand. We must know the values of the cross and own price elasticities and the marginal-to-average ratio of consumption for each good in order to determine the sign of the profit margins. But, if e ji is negligibly small, Proposition 1 is still effective. Although a few empirical works have been published on the cross elasticities of demand in telephone or electricity, they show that e j dominates e ji by great difference. For example, Auray examined the effects on U.S.A. interstate telephone traffic of an after 9 p.m. rate reduction in April 1963. For traffic in the 507-925 mileage band, night time (reduced rates) traffic has an elasticity of 0.55 with respect to its own price, whereas day time traffic has a cross price elasticity of 0.12 with respect to the night price. Parks and Weitzel [24] also derived cross price elasticities based on four goods for elasticity using July 1977 data from the Wisconsin Residential Time-ofUse Electricity Pricing Experiment. According to their analysis, the cross price elasticities ranged from 0.057 to 0.240, but the own elasticities were relatively large from 0.064 to 1.311.
APPENDIX B
To obtain a range for , we consider two complementary problems: problem 1: maximize Π subject to Π Ä F. problem 2: maximize F subject to F Ä Π .
It is clear that the feasible region of both problems is closed, and that the constraint in each problem is binding at the equality. This means that the maximum of problem 1 is also a maximum of problem 2. To drive a range for , the necessary condition on p i in problem 1 is used, Since the constraints are active with > 0 and z > 0, we get C z D 1 and conclude that the range for lies between zero and one.
APPENDIX C
A lump-sum tax must be paid regardless of the firm's physical quantity or the amount of profit. The firm's profit becomes
where T is the amount of the lump-sum tax. Building the Lagrangian function and setting the derivative of the function equal to zero yield the optimal solution. Since T is a constant, it vanishes upon differentiation. The enterprise's price and output levels are determined as would be the case if no tax were imposed.
A profit tax requires that the enterprise pay the government a specified proportion of the difference between the firm's total revenue and total cost. If the tax rate is flat, the firm's profit after tax payment is
where 0 < T 0 < 1. Making the Lagrangian function and setting the derivative of the function equal to zero yield the same first-order condition as in the no-tax case.
